On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Gulf of Tonkin - National Security Agency Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. . A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Oklahoma City Bombing. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. Early Military Career Nigerians await election results in competitive race. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Fluoride. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. Under cover of darkness, four boats (PTF-2, PTF-3, PTF-5, and PTF-6) left Da Nang, racing north up the coast toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ), then angling farther out to sea as they left the safety of South Vietnamese waters.2 About five hours later they neared their objective: the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. 8. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? 2, pp. Gulf Of Tonkin No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. McNamara was ready to respond. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. He also requested air support. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga (CVA-14) appeared on the scene, strafing three torpedo boats and sinking the one that had been damaged in the battle with the Maddox. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Conspiracy $22. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. The NSA report is revealing. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." We have no intention of yielding to pressure. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. 3. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. This article by Capt. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. The Taliban silenced him. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. Here's why he couldn't walk away. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. 8. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. . As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. . He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia.